The military collaboration of Moldova and the United States is closer than that between Transdniestria and Russia.

Moldova’s own state-run mouthpiece, Moldpres, quotes an official representative of the Moldovan military on increased collaboration between the U.S. military and Moldova, including a new project that …

fits into a bilateral programme on military collaboration between Moldova and the United States.

The announcement reveals financial support from the U.S. to the Moldovan army, and comes less than a week after another round of NATO-led military games ended inside Moldovan territory.

Collaboration with the United States’ military is not limited just to Moldova’s military. It cuts deep into the fabric of wide swatches of the Moldovan public administration: Moldpres adds that there is also participation from the Finance Ministry, Customs and Border Guards, and the Interior Ministry.

Moldovan law enforcement agencies cannot de facto prosecute in territory that is not under their effective control writes the Council of Europe in a report released April 29, 2008.

It goes on to say that -

Area currently not under the effective control of the Moldovan authorities

… the self-proclaimed “Republic of Transnistria” came into being on 2 September 1990. Since the region of Transnistria is not under the effective control of the Moldovan authorities, to whom this report is addressed, ECRI will not examine the situation in Transnistria.

New Cold Warrior Edward Lucas has been a chief apologist for why Kosovo should be allowed independence while Transdniestria should not. His Transdniestria-related articles, like those of his good friend and respected (by Lucas) collaborator Vladimir Socor, hype a fear of all things Russian which is obviously not shared by the Russian-friendly population of Transdniestria.

Now, in his latest missive for The Economist, his Russophobia hits a new low. In it, he rails against Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority but assures his readers that “grim post-Soviet mortality rates will shrink the problem eventually.” The problem is a civil rights problem for Russian-speaking population of Estonia (whom he called “Soviet migrants stranded by the empire’s collapse” - in reality people who legally lived and worked there for decades, and many of whom were born there).

Kirill Pankratov just about sums it up:

That’s essentially saying in plain words that “Good Russian is a dead Russian”, and if something can be done to “speed up the process” (wink, wink), that’s only for the better.

This is beyond despicable.
I guess if the next time Al Qaeda will blow up some office building full of neocon “wonks” and “journalists” like Lucas, I’d be applauding “shrinking of a problem” of proliferation of war-mongering thugs.

Edward Lucas is a bit of a self-confessed graphomanic nutjob and also a fan of the bigoted (no hyperbole) anti-Russian Captive Nations Committee.

Sadly, both for Transdniestria and for a fair and objective approach to the issues facing this captive would-be nation of 550,000 people, he holds the exclusive franchise at The Economist for covering Transdniestria. So caveat lector applies to every article on Transdniestria in that particular news source.

Romania has made it clear that it is (currently, at least) against an independent Transdniestria - just like it is also against an independent Kosovo.

But on April 17 Romanian President Traian Basescu has said, in a backhanded way, that Transdniestria has better grounds for being with Ukraine than with Moldova.

“If they in Kiev are intending to annex Transdniestria to Ukraine, they must take into account the necessity to bring territories of South Bessarabia and North Bukovina back to Moldova,” Basescu said.

Quick history check:

Transdniestria has been Russian since 1792.

It was part of Ukraine until 1924. In 1924, it became an autonomous republic (ASSR) within the Ukrainian SSR of the Soviet Union.

At the time, Moldova was part of Romania.

In 1940, Stalin invaded Moldova and merged it with Transdniestria in order to bring Moldova into the Soviet Union.

The result was the newly made Moldavian SSR. Moldova, while seeking its freedom and afterwards as well, officially denounced this move as illegal.

Now, Basescu recognizes that Transdniestria was part of Ukraine in the past - and not part of Moldova. He says that if Ukraine wants it back, it must give Moldova back some of the old Moldovan lands which are now part of Ukraine. And BTW, this was never a swap … so don’t even go there. 

In Japan, one of the country’s leading universities just published a new book on Transdniestria under the auspices of the Slavic Research Center’s program of Slavic Eurasian Studies.

Weighing in at nearly 250 pages, the book deals with Transdniestria in the context of Black Sea macroregional policy and covers Transdniestria’s history as well as the current positions of mediators and parties to the conflict.

Peer-reviewed and free of the one-sided propaganda of most English- and Romanian sources, it is a valuable research tool for serious scholars of the real situation on the ground. It is written in Russian and the entire contents can be accessed online in PDF format.

Chisinau wants Transdniestria to be part of Moldova, and (some in) Moscow may view this as a desirable result, too. But is it? And could it bring more peace … or just the opposite?

A deal between Moscow and Chisinau, bypassing Tiraspol, is bound to fail. For any solution to have staying power, it has to grow from what the people of Transdniestria want. They represent, after all, the most directly affected party.

Right now, Transdniestria is the most peaceful and calm of the frozen conflicts. It is also the one which has advanced most towards building a viable state with its own currency, an acceptable standard of living and a good prospect for economic survival. There are grounds to believe that the region is so peaceful precisely because Transdniestria currently lives as if it was already a separate state.

But when you take that away, and force the place to be part of Moldova, what will happen? A near totality of the 550,000 inhabitants of Transdniestria don’t want it. They are unlikely to accept any solution where they are not consulted, and which flies in the face of the outcome that 97% of them voted in favor of in 2006’s independence referendum.

All things considered, objectively and realistically, the best solution is a mutually negotiated and agreed-upon Friendship and Co-Operation Treaty.

The Joint Control Commission of the multilateral peacekeepers (Moldova, Russia, Transdniestria, Ukraine + OSCE) made it clear:

According to protocol № 530 of the United Investigation Commission of 24 June, 2004, law enforcement officials are categorically forbidden to bear weapons while patrolling the city block which is under the jurisdiction of PMR.

But the Moldovans do it anyway, in violation of peacekeeping agreements. No such infractions have been recorded by Transdniestria … only by Moldova.

The son of the head of Romania’s Communist-era state run propaganda bureau, rabid cold warrior Vladimir Socor, is today employed as a propagandist for a Dick Cheney related neocon outfit. He is often quoted as an analyst and commentator and has been known to plant false flag stories which (with a little help from his friends) can make it around the world a couple of times before they fall flat on their face.

Well, dig deeper and it turns out that the guy is actually an advisor to the Moldovan government.

Naturally, he himself doesn’t advertise the fact. Instead, his shtick is to present himself as a serious independent analyst while hinting at having close ties to the U.S. State Department and the White House (to this end, he uses his former employment with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to great theatrical effect. RFE/RL is a U.S. government propaganda outfit which was originally funded by the CIA).

In Moldova, George Sima has this to say:

the latter-day “adviser” to the current Moldovan leadership, Vlad Socor, an American of Romanian origin, whose opinion is recently viewed in the high circles of Chisinau’s cabinet as the certain and indisputable “indication to action” (probably because this suspicious “political scientist” is directly linked to the U.S. State Department !?)

Sima was a former government minister in the Moldovan cabinet, so he has an inside track on who does what in high circles. (Original here).

In an interview with PMR Foreign Minister Valeri Litskai, Oleg Elkov - editor in chief of Olvia Press - confirms Socor’s Moldovan advisor-status:

[…] Commentary made last week by Vladimir Socor, advisor to the Moldovan President

According to Voronin’s advisor, in this case, Moldova will be able to achieve its objectives in Transdniestria.

If he came out and said it as it is, this facade would crumble. “I’ve been working as a close advisor to the Moldovan government all along, and my job is to plant the kind of spin that they want and trick you into believing it as fact.”

Socor’s side-gig as a Moldovan Rasputin has made him the mouthpiece for some of the most vile anti PMR commentary this side of Oazu Nantoi. Like his personal friend Edward Lucas, he would hate to see Transdniestria’s independence become recognized, so he is beating the Cold War drums and sees red whenever he hears someone speak Russian.

The Regnum news agency has a long but very interesting backgrounder on the real status of the independence of the unrecognized states of Transdniestria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

It looks in detail at how the Kosovo precedent has put Russian diplomacy in a hard spot. It also discounts the urban myth of Transdniestria (and the others) being mere puppets of Moscow. Why?

because it is clear that the policies that they carry out do not always coincide with Russia’s and indeed sometimes blatantly contradict official statements by the Kremlin. Politically, the ‘de facto’ independent states have never been as independent and indeed, they have never been as unrecognized [as today].

Über-propagandist Vladimir Socor has a frequent spin about how Tiraspol’s leadership are paid by the Russian Federation and are mere puppets of Moscow. But instead of taking him at face value (a false premise which will lead to incorrect conclusions), read the long and serious analysis from Regnum and then judge for yourself.

In Russian here. A couple of robot translations here and here.

The story behind the story is where it took place: The 90 minute historic (sort of) meeting between Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov was held in a Transdniestrian government office in Bender, inside Transdniestria’s borders.

Check out the two flags in the background: The red and green of the PMR next to the yellow which is the city flag of pro-independence Bender.

No Moldovan flags in evidence anywhere, unless you count the little table thingie which Voronin brought with him (and took back with him when he returned to Moldova after the meeting). More here and here.

A Moldovan newspaper article, which PMR news agency Olvia Press of course quickly reprinted, says that there is more political plurality in Transdniestria than in Moldova:

Today’s Chisinau must envy Tiraspol, where it was proved that it is possible to hold professional discussions that are not tainted with the interests and ideology of just one single party.

Democracy is a relative term, but little by little evidence is emerging that there is more of it in Transdniestria. And that Moldova’s democracy is not all that it is puffed up to be.

On May 15 the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, will host a series of panels under the heading “Opening the World Order to de facto States: Limits and Potentialities of de facto States in the International Context.”

The conference will be held under the auspices of UNPO along with the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, a centrist coalition which is the third largest 3rd largest political group in the European Parliament. The hope is that by discussing the issues of unrecognized countries in a neutral setting, new aspects of democracy and good governance issues in the de facto states will be brought to light. The event is sponsored by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

So what is wrong with such a conference? Only that some of the most insightful speakers are missing.  Pal Kolstoe, Scott Pegg and Dov Lynch are there. But notably absent are…

Peter Armstrong, foreign policy adviser to the government of Canada

Charles King, Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University (Washington DC)

James Jatras, former Republican Senate adviser on foreign policy

Carne Ross, former UN Security Council diplomat, and currently head of Independent Diplomat who works with Somaliland, Western Sahara, Northern Cyprus and Kosovo

Frank Engel, from Luxembourg’s Parliament and also NKR’s Honorary Consul

Samantha Power, Pulitzer Prize winner and foreign policy expert from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Many of these names are not specifically “PMR-friendly.” But they know what they are talking about, and the more light we can shed on the real situation in Transdniestria, the better off everyone will be.
Also sadly missing from the guest list and from the panel are important analysts like …

George Hewitt
Barry Bartmann
Bruno Coppieters
Stuart Hensel (The Economist)
Mark Almond (BHHRG)
Ronald Hill (Trinity College, Dublin)

In summary, while such an event has good potential, the choice of panelists and speakers virtually guarantees that it will be a timid and weak affair. Simply because some of the most insightful names in the field are missing. And that is everyone’s loss.

Social scientists know that relative levels of voter participation versus voter apathy are reliable indicators of the sense of “ownership” which citizens, including minority groups, feel towards the state in which they live. This is equally true for unrecognized states or partially unrecognized states such as Transdniestria and Kosovo.

So who is on board and supportive of these places and their respective nation building efforts?

According to the Southeast European Times, a web-only Public Diplomacy effort which is financed entirely by the U.S. Department of Defense,

Election data showed that only around 1% of the approximately 120,000 eligible Kosovo Serb voters went to the polls.

In Transdniestria, an approximate equal number of ethnic Moldovans are eligible to vote. Turnout for this ethnic minority is consistently above 60% versus the 1% among the Serb minority in Kosovo. Moreover, other sociological indicators back up the conclusions to be inferred from voter turnout data: here and here.

As Transdniestria becomes more and more convinced that Kosovo is indeed a precedent, some in Moldovan and their supporters are trying to turn back the tide of history by suggesting that Kosovo’s road to U.S.-recognized independence can only be a precedent if it is studiously carbon-copied millimeter by millimeter. This includes dismantling the otherwise successful state and forcing it under U.N. (UNMIK-style) administration for nearly a decade prior to independence. And it includes some 16,000 NATO troops on the ground, too.

Vladimir Socor, a propagandist working for a Dick Cheney related neocon outfit, has made it clear that the Kosovo precedent for Transdniestria is only valid if Transdniestria gets the whole “NATO treatment”; troops and all.

Socor is a neocon nutter with the most wild-eyed anti PMR bias this side of Oazu Nantoi (and that says a lot). The son of the Romanian dictatorship’s top propaganda boss, Vlad Socor now works for the CIA-endorsed Jamestown Foundation where he is beating the war drums and sees red whenever he hears the word “Russia”.

The latest victim to succumb to his “all or nothing” precedent spiel is Nicu Popescu, a Moldovan of course, who breathlessly fantasizes about “guver­nata de UE sau ONU timp de 8-10 ani.”
Now, what would happen if the government of the PMR actually took these Cold War hawkers seriously and let NATO troops, EU troops or UN troops run loose inside its borders? Would the people of Transdniestria be better off? Or worse?
Here’s a hint, from a video made by actual NATO soldiers on duty in Kosovo. They themselves filmed this clip on the ground in the barren, war-torn wasteland:

Even seven years ago, the PMR was “successfully established and consolidated” according to OSCE’s resident Transdniestria-expert Claus Neukirch:

Since its declaration of independence on 2 September 1990 the ‘Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic’ (‘PMR’) has successfully established and consolidated its own state-like structure. In Transdniestria, alongside a president and a parliament there are, inter alia, a supreme court and a national bank, which issues its own currency, the Transdniestrian rouble. Border services, the police, internal security and border guards serve alongside the army as important pillars of power. Strong symbols like the constitution, the national anthem, the coat of arms, flags and several monuments commemorating the 1992 war, have strengthened the Transdniestrians ideological base.

Neukirch, whose other writings on Transdniestria show that he is 100% pro-Moldovan and anti-independence, was forced to admit that the small but viable state actually works:

One has to concede, that the ‘PMR’ functions relatively well,

but at the same time, he felt compelled to add a waiver:

at least from the point of view of its rulers and some influential groups, which support them.

Now … if Transdniestria as a state was viable and worked so good in 2001, it works even better now after seven years of reforms, market-liberalizations, a free economy, and the consolidation of a multi party system. So why fix what isn’t broken?

But read the original text here, from the 2001 paper published by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.

Claus Neukirch is today the Spokesperson/Press and Public Affairs Officer for the OSCE Mission to Chisinau, Moldova.

Prior to his current OSCE job, the German political scientist worked with the International Crisis Group (ICG). He has written a number of papers on how to “solve the Transnistria problem,” where the emphasis has always been on “solving” it within the context of a single unified state against the will of the Transdniestrian population.

The Duma Committee for CIS on March 13th, following a hearing on unrecognized republics, recommended an upgrading of relations with Abkhazia, Transdniestria, and South Ossetia including the possibility of recognition.

Other recommendations included or reported are the establishment of diplomatic missions in the regions with the foreign ministry to decide whether they are consulates or another type of mission, a removal of import duties on goods created by businesses with Russian shareholders in the regions, and increased humanitarian and economic assistance for Russian passport holders in the regions.

Alexei Ostrovsky, chairman of the lower house’s committee on former Soviet affairs said at the parliamentary hearing:

The world community should understand that from now on the resolution of conflicts in the ex-Soviet area cannot be seen in any other context from that of Kosovo.

Participation of the breakaway republics in international organizations and forums was also mentioned in a press release before the hearings. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily described the hearing as “the launch of a procedure of recognition.” The committee recommendations are set to be put before a vote a week after the hearing.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said the ministry would “look carefully at all the recommendations” but that Russian policy remained unchanged.

In the words of top analyst Sergey Markedonov:

In Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Transdnestr and Nagorny Karabakh, the Kosovo case is seen as a legal precedent. This means that the elites of states recognized by the UN (Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan) had aimed to “solve the problem of territorial integrity” before Kosovo proclaimed its independence. After Kosovo’s recognition this year, states with territorial integrity issues have started increasing their militarist rhetoric.

If this wasn’t bad enough, he also says of the still-unrecognized countries that:

Some of them need to fight for being recognized even if the recognition comes the day after tomorrow, not tomorrow.

and:

… when there are no criteria for officially recognizing de-facto states and when the mechanisms of conflict resolution are reduced to politically correct small talk, the factor of strength becomes, as the classics once put it, “the midwife of history.”

Advice to Moldova: Before you made your self-defeating July 2005 law on PMR’s hoped-for status, you should’ve checked what you already promised the Transdniestrians ten years earlier.

As per this interesting detail from Pål Kolstø:

In 1995, Moldova agreed with Transdniestria that the latter should be granted “a legal status as a state” (in Russian, gosudarstvenno-pravovoi status).

…And, for the record, in the same book Kolstø also confirms that Transdniestria today “enjoys de facto independence.”

Whether Transdniestria stays ‘de facto’ independent, is granted legal recognition or becomes absorbed into Moldova, one thing is certain: Its flag and other symbols of state will remain.

Even for Moldova, there is nothing uncontroversial in the fact that Transdniestria keeps its own red-and-green flag, a separate coat of arms, anthem, etc. This was actually already written into law in the Moldovan Parliament’s July 2005 legislation on the special status of PMR.

Now, Moldova’s President has confirmed that Transdniestria will keep its flag, etc., no matter what. In an interview with Kommersant, Vladimir Voronin says:

Pridnestrovie will keep everything: Coat of arms, flag, official languages (there are three of them in PMR: Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian), which they consider necessary.

Russia’s largest news agency, RIA Novosti, also confirms the information. According to its article, Moldova has no problem with

giving the unrecognized republic autonomy status with wide-ranging powers, its emblem, flag, national languages, as well as electing a new parliament, in which MPs will come from Transdniestria.

Fittingly, RIA Novosti’s article is accompanied by a map of Moldova and Transdniestria overlaid with the (uncontroversial and not at all disputed) Transdniestrian flag.

In fact, the use by Transdniestria of its own flag has been just fine with Moldova for more than 12 years. On the 11th of March 1996, Presidents Igor Smirnov (PMR) and Mircea Snegur (Moldova) signed the “Protocol of Matched Questions,” which, inter alia, lets Transdniestria have its own Constitution and state symbolism such as the flag and its coat of arms.

But there is a long way to go before anyone can convince the Transdniestrians that they are better off inside a Moldova which they don’t want to be part of, than by pursuing their own independence (favored by some 97% of the population, as per the latest 2006 democratic referendum).

Transdniestria wants to put the “black hole” myth behind it once and for all:

In fact, staging the myth of the “black hole” is a well-known phenomenon of the science of deformation of consciousness, called gipostazirovaniem (Greek Hypostasis - the essence, substance). According to the Russian political scientist S. Kara-Murza, this phenomenon is widely used in manipulative technologies.  It is aimed at creating in the minds of individual or group of individuals abstract, vague images, which represent an imaginary world, forming a sort of parallel reality.  These images do not rely on well-designed concepts and indicated generally brief, which was irrational, magical force (in this case - “black hole”). […] Today the European consciousness after a long gipostazirovaniya, literally permeates false, misleading essence, which creates a perversion of the Transdniestrian reality.

And, ends the article from www.pmr21.info:

The legend of the “black hole” must be exposed.

Full text here.